A. N. Whitehead: Bir Ayrıştırma Deneyimi Olarak Modernite Eleştirisi, No: 14 - 12/2018
Başlık
:
A. N. Whitehead: Bir Ayrıştırma Deneyimi Olarak Modernite Eleştirisi
Yazar(lar)
:
Muammer ÇOBAN
Title
:
A. N. Whitehead: Criticism of Modernity as a Decomposition Experience
Anahtar Kelimeler
:
Modern Felsefe, töz-nitelik, özne, deneyim, kapsayıcı bütünlük
Key Words
:
Modern Philosophy, substance-quality, subject, experience, inclusive whole
Özet 1 / Abstract 1
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Bu makale, A. N. Whitehead’in, deneyim kavramı üzerinden, modernite ve on yedinci–on sekizinci yüzyıllar bilimsel evren tasarımlarına getirdiği eleştirileri açımlamayı hedeflemektedir. Whitehead’e göre geleneksel felsefelerin töz-nitelik ayrımı ve bunun modern-kartezyen dönüşümleri varlığın varlıkla olan tüm ilişkilerini kesintiye uğratmıştır. Dahası, on yedinci yüzyılın sonunda, fizik bilimindeki gelişmeler, felsefenin önemini geri plana iterken, usun dış dünyayla olan ayrılığını kesinler. Dönemin soyutlamalara dayalı gerçeklik tasarımı, usun bir ürünü olarak ortaya çıkan bu soyutlukların somutlukmuş gibi algılanmasına yol açarken geriye kalan her şey anlamsızlığın alanına itilir. Böylece doğa cansız, renksiz, amaçsız bir karşıtlık haline dönüşür. Deneyim kavramı ise özü bakımından anlaşıldığında, bir şeyin salt deneyimlenmesi değil bütün dünyanın deneyim olarak kavranmasıdır. Böyle bir etkinlikte her bir deneyim damlası diğer tüm deneyim damlalarıyla karşılıklı olarak ilişki içindedir. Organizma Felsefesi için, oluşturulan bu deneyimsel bütünlük, evreni meydana getiren en temel yapıyı ifade eder.
Özet 2 / Abstract 2
:
This paper, through the concept of experience, aims to elucidate the criticisms that A. N. Whitehead brought to the modernity and scientific universe designs of the seventeenth-eighteenth centuries. According to Whitehead, distinction of substance-quality and its transformations of modern – cartesian, interrupts all the relations of ‘being’ with ‘being’. Furthermore, by the end of the seventeenth century, while the developments in physics, caused a disregard for the importance of philosophy, it confirmed the distinction of the mind with the outside world. The design of reality based on abstractions of the period leads to the perception of these abstractions that appear as a product of reason as concreteness, while the rest is pushed into the realm of insignificance. Thus, the nature turns into a lifeless, colorless and aimless contrariety. However, the concept of ‘experience’, as considered with its essence, is not the mere experience of something, but realizing the entire world as an experience. In such an activity, every drop of experience interconnects with the all other drops of experience. For Philosophy of Organism, this experiential whole, points out the fundamental for the constitution of the universe.
Extended Summary
:
This paper, through the concept of experience, aims to elucidate the criticisms that A. N. Whitehead has made about modernity and the universe scientificly designed in seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. According to Whitehead, the distinction between the substance and quality of traditional philosophies and its modern-cartesian transformations interrupted the all relations of being with being. Moreover, at the end of the seventeenth century, with the developments in physics, the importance of philosophy was pushed back and the separation with the external world became definite. While the design of the reality in those periods causes those abstractions, which are the products of Reason, to be considered as though they are concrete, that design makes meaningless whatever the rest. The outcome of this perspective is that nature turns into a mechanical, lifeless, colorless, purposeless ‘other’. On the contrary, the concept of experience in essence is not the mere experience of something, but understanding of the whole world as experience. In this context, the expression of reality is to show that each drop of experience is interconnected with all other drops of experience. Except this, there is no such thing as something in itself or reality in itself. For Whitehead, when we are talking about relations in traditional sense, what is generally understood is universals. However, when relations among entities -or as Whitehead named ‘actual entities’- are reduced to the use of one or more universals, the thing that seems like a relationship is actually a disjointed irrelevance. Because the relationship does not only arise with the binding effect of the abstract universal, but also requires the concrete contents of entities.In this framework, explaining how the fate of togetherness of all existence modes described in terms of vital and lifeness, microscobic and macroscobic or consicous and unconsicous is decomposed is the core aspect of the Whitehead’s critique on modern philosophy and science. Following that Whiteheadian path, it is a necessity to unveil the results of modern philosophical subjectivism and sensualism polarized in opposing sides on the one hand and the delusions of the understanding of reality which is depended on the extreme abstractions in modern science, which also haunts whole philosophical way of thinking, on the other. In this context, under the title of “Modern Ontology”, it is clarified the critique directed to Cartesian design which decomposes the world into two as the external one (res extensa), which is identified as the pre-determined non-living nature, and the reason (cogito) which is the knowing subject. What the main assumption of that Cartesian design is that the universe is full of substantive beings whose only external relations are shaped by reason, but without any internal connection among them. Yet, how can it be grounded that a substance shares the universe with another one without any connection? Although the question is answered by Leibniz and Monists, Whitehead finds those answers arbitrary. Hence no explanation based on substantial philosophies are convenient for revealing the inclusive whole of experience for Whitehead. Under the title of “Epistemology,” it is explained Whitehead’s “The Subjectivist and Sensualist Principles” in connection with his critiques on Descartes, Hume and Kant. According to Whitehead, any philosophical system which makes a strict disctintion between those principles sinks into either over-subjectivity or over-objectivity. For instance, Descartes's stress on the substance as subject, enjoying conscious experience is interpreted by Whitehead as the greatest discovery that balances over- objectivity since ancient philosophy; yet, Descartes couldn’t understand the importance of his own discovery. Hume, however, puts an emphasis on sensualism. Nevertheless, in Hume's experience analysis, there are serious inconsistencies in the relationships of experiencing subject about the external world and the self-identity, because the reason cannot go beyond the ‘presentational immediacy’ to discover the relationships among the things. For Whitehead, Hume did the right thing with an emphasis on experience in his perception analysis, but he could not provide objective content to the experience because he only dealt with this experience in the context of universals. “According to Humian principles what has happened in experience has happened in experience, and that is all that can be said” (Whitehead, 1978:167). Kant, on the other hand, is able to provide only a quasi-content to experience as he startes his “Critique” in terms of the subject reacting to the data encountered. For him, the experimental process is the process of thinking; so it can only be defined through the exertion for understanding. The only thing seen in Kant is the first touch which is provided by the sensual impressions to the whole knowing. The rest of the knowing activity is proceeded by “Pure Reason” and its categories. On the other hand, for Whitehead, the process is not the activity of understanding, but a feeling process. In this sense, the actual entity creates its own immediate experience by the concrete content of its own life. Under the title, “From the Hypothetical World to the Concrete World,” the main delusions of the substantial philosophies and sciences are elucidated in the framework of Whitehead’s specific terminology. As the expression, ‘fallacy of misplaced concretness’ signifies the issues arising when the subject gives meanings to the external world without joining the process of experience as if onlookers, the expression, ‘fallacy of simple location’ represents the critiques to the scientific universe designs in the 17th. and 18th centuries. Those universe designs, called ‘scientific materialism’ has two negative aspects: The first is that the causal continuity can not be explained by those designs, and the second is that the notion of chance is impossible in those contexts. As a result, Whitehead does not deny that the understanding of substance and, relatedly, the philosophies which reduce experience only to experience of consicous are successfull in a certain period and that they contribute to philosophical thought, but he claims all these systemic ways of thinking produce a kind of blindness blocking the new when they lose their achievements. In this respect, Whitehead tries to overcome those blocks through the concept of experience.
Pdf
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A. N. Whitehead: Bir Ayrıştırma Deneyimi Olarak Modernite Eleştirisi Tam Metin / Full Text
No: 14 - 12/2018 - Tüm Makaleler
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